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Public transport traditionally has been, and still is, heavily subsidised by local or national
governments, which have been motivated by declining average cost arguments, social
considerations, and the desire to offer an alternative to private car use. Conventional
sources for funding, including general taxes on labour, in many occasions have become
harder to sustain for various reasons. This paper explores alternative, increasingly
implemented, sources of funding, i.e., local charges or taxes that are hypothecated to
support (urban) public transport (such as local sales taxes, parking charges etc.). Based on
an overview of several case-studies all over the world, it is found that there is a large
potential for applying unconventional charging mechanisms. Not only as means of raising
financial support for public transport systems, but also as a method of sending appropriate
(from a sustainable point of view) pricing signals to transport use.
1. Introduction
Public transport refers to a collective transport system, which is made available, usually
against payment, for any person who wishes to use it. Public transportation services can be
provided at various scale levels and can take different forms. Common in many cities is the
public bus and to a lesser extent the tram. Fewer countries have underground services or
rapid rail. At the interurban and regional scale, bus and trains provide public transit services.
An important characteristic of these services is that state and local government are normally
largely involved in financing and operation, because public transportation is often an
unprofitable business activity nowadays.
Over the past years, public transport companies have been supported primarily by federal,
state and local funds and revenues from fares. Many agencies have had to cope with the costs
associated with broadening policy goals. At the same time, elements of transit provision
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continue to demand more financial resources. The labour-intensive nature of the public
transit industry, the increasing maintenance needs of the older systems and the
suburbanisation of jobs and residences have combined to burden many agencies’ cost and
revenue structures (TCRP, 1998). This has led to a general apprehension about the growing
gap between operating expenses and revenues. This need for additional funding is in clear
contrast with the recent trend of reduced government financial support for public services
(especially in Europe). It is a clear fact that government sources dedicated to transit (tax
revenues) are becoming more and more limited and uncertain. For this reason, authorities
(often together with transit operators) are increasingly interested in alternative sources of
funding. Innovative funding techniques may include the developing of non-farebox revenue
from concessions, adopting private sector methods (e.g. turnkey development), new fare
structures, value capture strategies, use of property rights, leasing techniques and
hypothecated (local) taxation.
In this paper the term unconventional, hypothecated taxes or charges is used to refer to a
wide number of local taxes or charges, some or all of the revenues from which are directly
earmarked to support public transport. The general idea is that revenues gained from some
kind of charge are dedicated to finance operating or investment costs of public transport.
This can take various forms. A well-known example in Europe is the introduction of a
dedicated local employment tax (the Versement transport) in 1971 (see also Farrell, 1999).
But there are many other, less known, examples which are equally interesting. This paper
will deal with these unconventional charging schemes and provide a world-wide overview of
practical experiences. In the end an assessment based on several criteria will be carried out to
derive some general lessons.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 will offer some general notes on the various
subsidy forms and points out several arguments to provide subsidy to public transport. In
section 3 the various case-studies will be outlined, starting with the employer/employee taxes
and ending with some miscellaneous forms of charges. Section 4 will carry on with the
assessment of these categories in order to derive some main outcomes and results. Finally,
section 5 will present some conclusive remarks.
2. Financial assistance for public transport
2.1 Subsidies
Since virtually all public transport systems operate at a deficit, they are obviously obtaining
funds from other sources to balance their books and stay in operation. These funds come
from federal or local governments. Money provided to cover these deficits is usually called a
subsidy. A subsidy can be defined as a payment that does not require a direct exchange of
goods or services of equal market value in return; it is used to accomplish a specific
objective or has a specific effect (Black, 1995).  It is an example of a transfer payment. A
subsidy is not a gift; there are strings attached to the use of it. Various forms of subsidies
exist, also in the public transport market.
One form of subsidy is called deficit financing, where a loss (unexpectedly) incurred is
written off by the controlling authority. All or part of an accumulated debt may be written
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off, either at the end of the year in which it has been incurred, or at a later date, for example,
to prepare an undertaking for privatisation. Governments may give money to a transit agency
threatened with bankruptcy. Deficit financing is an unsatisfactory form of financial support,
because it is open-ended and it provides no incentives to management to control costs.
Related to subsidies are cross-subsidies between different user classes. Cross-subsidies occur
when revenues in excess of (variable) costs for one group are used to finance deficits
incurred for other groups. Sometimes, the transfer of money was never intended nor
anticipated. For instance, nobody planned for off-peak transit riders to subsidise peak-period
riders; it just happened because of aversion to changing fares (too much) in the middle of the
day. Another well-known example of cross subsidisation (see also Section 3) involves cross
utility subsidies, where the profits from other utilities cover expenses of the loss-making
public transport.
2.2 Why subsidies
Many public services (such as police) collect no revenues and are therefore technically
subsidised because provision is being regarded as necessary. Besides, it can be impractical to
put all operations on a fee-for-service basis. Public transport does collect revenues (fares) but
it is still often being regarded as a public service and subsidised. Economists have offered
some justifications for subsidies to public transport, among which the following are often
cited (see also Black, 1995 and Gwilliam, 1999).
First public transport is being marked as a decreasing cost industry. Fixed costs are large,
especially for rail systems, and variable costs are relatively small. Public transport companies
usually operate at less than capacity (they could carry more riders with little increase in
costs); marginal costs for an extra passenger are consequently low.  Therefore, if price is set
equal to the marginal cost (this is the economic rule in price setting as being the most
efficient allocation of resources and maximising social welfare), public transport operators
will suffer a loss, because marginal cost is less than average cost. It may be clear that funds
must be raised somewhere to keep these operators in business. This financial support is often
provided in the form of a subsidy if public transport is deemed to be in the public interest.
The second argument that has often been used refers to an indirect form of positive
externalities (economic behaviour of parties that creates benefits to non-paying others) of
public transport. This can be seen as a second best consideration: as long as road use is not
fairly and efficiently priced, there is an argument for subsidising its substitute. When some
people switch from automobile to transit, this reduces air pollution, congestion and noise,
which benefits other people who are no transit users. This will generate lower external costs
and therefore public transit should be subsidised.
A next argument is often called the ‘equity’ argument. A major argument for subsidising
transit is the redistribution of income to certain groups. It transfers real income in the form of
transit service rather than cash. Some groups in society, which are largely dependent on this
service, will benefit from this subsidy. Among these target groups are the very poor, the
disabled and elderly. Critics often point at the effectiveness of this argument as it depends on
the extent to which these groups use transit, because subsidies are primarily going to the
providers. It may be argued that the intended redistribution could be accomplished in a less
distortive way.
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So it becomes clear that subsidies in this context of the public transportation market have
been justified on various grounds. However, it should be acknowledged that some recent
research suggests that even when taking account of second-best considerations, current
subsidies are excessive and economic efficiency would be served better by increased rather
than increased subsidies (Proost et al., 1999). In this paper we are not so much concerned
with the question whether public transport should be subsidised, but rather we will consider
the various ways of raising revenues, taking the desire of subsidisation as given. The optimal
amount of subsidy is indeed also another question. Several economists have made theoretical
derivations of optimal transit fares. Attempts to devise operational pricing rules for urban
transport are for example reviewed by Nash (1978), while subsidy policy is discussed by Else
(1992). Their recommendations are in general not very practical, it is basically a political
decision as to what amount of subsidy is given. There is a wide variation without any
standard pattern also depending on local circumstances (e.g. network configuration,
operating costs).
Apart from the amount of the subsidy, yet another question is exactly what should be
subsidised. One popular view is that government subsidies for infrastructure provision (e.g.
rail) are defensible on efficiency grounds: a considerable share of the losses with optimal
marginal cost pricing may result from the large fixed cost of infrastructure. However, the
operation of the services may in many circumstances involve constant or even decreasing
returns to scale, in which case one of the major economic motivations for subsidies would
vanish.1 Deregulation and privatisation policies may then involve the auctioning of the rights
to operate a service to private companies (see Small and Gómez-Ibáñez, 1999).
It is important to emphasise at this point that, in this paper, we are not concerned with the
efficiency aspects and more general desirability of subsidisation of public transport per se.
Rather, we merely aim to review the pros and cons of various unconventional ways of doing
so, as they follow from the cases we study. The next section starts with an overview.
3. Funding sources for transit; unconventional charges and taxes
3.1 Introduction
Traditionally, financial support for public transport is financed by general taxation revenues.
The authorities (federal or local) collect the revenues from various taxes; individual and
corporate taxes are the biggest sources. In these cases, the funds originate from the same mix
of revenue sources as for other public services. This means that there is no direct link
between the source of revenue and its dedication (no hypothecation). The major problem
with these forms of financing for public transport is that there is a great deal of competition
for public funds, and public transport often loses out to spending on, for example, education
and health. This is problematic because of the need for large sums of money being spent over
long periods of time, which in transport tends to be the rule and not the exception. This has
                                                
1 This argument ignores the so-called ‘Mohring effect’, which is the reverse of congestion, and reflects the
positive externality that public transport users create for each other through the increased frequency that is (in
the long run) associated with increased usage (Mohring, 1972).
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led to a search for new sources of funding, which have included the private sector (via
privatisation or contracting agreements) and earmarked charges or taxes.
This second category, the unconventional taxes or charges, refers to a wide number of local
taxes and charges, some or all of the revenue from which is directly hypothecated to fund
public transport. In recent years, the use of earmarked taxes for local transport demand
management has attracted growing attention. This is linked with the above mentioned trend
of seeking additional funding, and the trend to devolve responsibility for local and regional
public transport away from national government in a number of EU states. This has led to the
desire to devolve funding mechanisms, too.
It is interesting to see whether these unconventional funding mechanisms can form a reliable
source of income for public transport and to which extent they are implemented in practice.
After an extensive study it appears that a wide variety of implemented and proposed schemes
exist throughout the world. We have identified nine different categories, which we will
discuss.
3.2 Employer/employee taxes
While employer and local income taxes are collected by national and local governments
world-wide, only in a few cities these are hypothecated to pay for public transport systems.
Local payroll taxes are used for public transport both in the United States and in Europe.
Portland and Eugene in Oregon are well-known examples in the U.S. The State of Oregon
has authorised local transit agencies to use a payroll tax to generate revenue. Louisville and
Cincinnati use municipal income taxes to finance public transport subsidies.
In Europe, dedicated employment taxes have been used in France, a well-known example
being the Versement. The high level of investment and light rail schemes has been made
possible by the introduction of this tax. It was first collected in Paris in 1971, then extended
to provincial cities of smaller size (Farrell, 1999). The tax must be paid by all firms with
more than nine employees, unless these are housed on the premises or the firm provides its
own transport for employees. In a similar way, the Vienna underground has been financed by
a local payroll tax.
3.3 Property related taxes
As with the employer tax, part of the logic behind the property tax centres around the
concept that by providing a public transport service, the occupants of the properties served
benefit (in this case by an increase in the value of the property). Thus, the tax can be seen as
a form of recapturing value. This value capture mechanism has been defined by Tsukada and
Kuranami (1994) as a mechanism by which the agency responsible for the development of
the urban transport infrastructure captures part of the financial benefit gained by land
developers or the community at large. This benefit is reflected in an increase in the real
property value, which can be regarded as a comprehensive index of all the benefits generated
by the development, including improved accessibility and increased business opportunities.
This process of ‘value recapturing’ can be divided into taxes and the usually one-off or
irregular developer levies (see also section 3.4). The tax can be defined here as properties
paying regular and continuous amounts to local or regional government, which then
earmarks a specified amount to subsidise public transport.
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Paying for the provision of public services through the collection of property (or land) taxes
is a fairly common method world-wide, being evident throughout Europe, Asia and North
America. However, for the most part the money is collected by authorities and allocated to
each sector according to prevailing political objectives. However, earmarked property taxes
to fund public transport are common in North America, in cities like Minneapolis, New
York, Denver, Detroit, Miami, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Vancouver (Simpson, 1994;
Bushell, 1994). Examples of earmarked property taxes outside North America are rare, but
can still be found in Japan (e.g. Osaka), India (Mumbai) and Spain (Barcelona).
3.4 Development levies
Value recapturing is not necessarily restricted to property taxes; development levies can also
be introduced. Various mechanisms can be placed under this heading. This tends to operate
within planning rules, and is consequently often more flexible and individually tailored. Sims
and Berry (1999) report that value capture through specific taxes or charges has included:
! Development charges, whereby part of the cost of transport would be recovered by special
charges on different land uses, usually levied at the time of new development of properties
in the benefiting areas;
! Benefit sharing, which is similar but which is tied specifically to the increase in property
values resulting from public investment;
! Density bonusing, in the vicinity of public transport stations whereby participation in a
program is voluntary. Developers may choose to participate or not; they receive extra
density or extra permissions to build, but they pay for them. A similar type of scheme is
tendering or auction of density, where a fixed amount of density is put up for auction;
! Connection charge, whereby a property owner pays a specific fee to be connected directly
to the transit system.
Examples of implementation in practice of these kind of schemes can be found all over the
world. Quite many are to be found in North America, e.g. the Transport Impact Development
Fund in San Francisco, the joint development of Bethesda Station in Washington and density
bonusing in Portland. In Europe, a development charge scheme can be found in Hamburg,
Germany. Joint development schemes also came into existence in Japan and Hong Kong,
where the new railway between the central business district and the new international airport
is financed by development levies. Finally, in Montreal (Canada) an underground city around
the metro has been created by connection fees.
3.5 Parking charges and fines
Parking charges are a normal fact of life and are used throughout the world by local
authorities to fund their activities. As such they cannot be viewed in themselves as an
unconventional mechanism. However, such charges are only rarely hypothecated to support
public transport or as a part of a planned transport funding package. Clear examples are to be
found in England. Revenues of parking charges in Milton Keynes are dedicated to support
public transport being part of a transport and parking strategy. This example shows the
potential of these charges in linking it closely to environmental and transport planning
processes. Another scheme is implemented at the Heathrow, Stansted and Gatwick airports,
where passengers contribute an average 25 pence for every parking transaction. The revenues
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are credited to a budget that goes towards improving public transport within and around each
specific airport. Additional schemes are noticed elsewhere. Revenues from city-centre
parking are also used in Amsterdam to partly fund a new tramline.  Similar implementations
world-wide include Aspen (Colorado), Miami (Florida), La Spezia, Verona and Milan in
Italy.
A related source of funding to parking levies is that of parking fines. In France, additional
revenues from parking fines and driving offences have been earmarked to pay for public
transport infrastructure since 1973. This was enabled by the passing of the same piece of
finance legislation that resulted in the Versement in 1971. In the special case of the Ile-de-
France region part of the proceeds from motoring fines are used to subsidise public transport
(Simpson, 1994). In Athens, Greece, part of the charges imposed on private cars that violate
bus lanes will be passed to the local public transport authority.
3.6 Charges for the use of roadspace
The idea of charging for the use of roads is an old one. Already in the late 17th and early 18th
centuries many roads in the United States were built as private toll roads. Recently road
charging has again attracted interest (especially within the EU). One, more traditional reason,
is to generate revenue, particularly for the construction of new roads. A second and more
recent reason is to manage traffic congestion and air pollution. But these revenues could also
be used to support public transport. Although road (and congestion) charging is not widely
implemented, there are some experiences where revenues are transferred to fund public
transport.
Urban toll roads in Europe are very much a Scandinavian phenomenon (Farrell, 1999).
Tolling in Bergen (first introduced in 1986), Oslo (1990) and Trondheim (1991) are based on
a cordon system, in which vehicles (public transport exempted) must pay for entry to the city
centre, and the revenues are intended to fund a mixture of road and public transport
investments. Tolling is also common in the United States, but often related to use of bridges
and tunnels. Some of these toll revenues may be hypothecated to public transport. In San
Francisco, Golden Gate bridge tolls are used to subsidise inter-county traffic services,
including bus and ferry. Bridge and tunnel tolls are also important funding sources in New
York and Philadelphia.
While the former examples were more aimed at raising revenues, there are also schemes
initiated at reducing congestion. Congestion charges have had to be paid in Singapore since
1975 (Small and Gómez-Ibáñez, 1998). The collected fees from the Area License Scheme
have helped to improve public transport as being a substitute for car traffic. A similar scheme
is implemented on a highway (Interstate 15) near San Diego. Here, road users can choose
whether to take the congested lanes or pay and use a congestion free lane. This charge
depends on the level of congestion on the highway. Revenues are partly used to finance an
express bus service in the I-15 corridor.
All previously mentioned schemes have been implemented in practice. However, there are
cases where implementation failed, mainly due to a shortage of political support. Public
transport would have been supported in Hong Kong (Electronic Road Pricing), Cambridge
(congestion metering scheme) and Stockholm (the Dennis package) if the plans had
materialised.
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3.7 Local motoring taxes
A local motoring tax is a tax levied on motorists by local jurisdictions for local purposes
(one of them being public transport) and is collected in addition to state and federal motor
fuel taxes. Taxing motor vehicles is common all over the world (mostly nationally levied),
but revenues are scarcely directly earmarked (on a local basis) to fund specific objectives.
These motoring taxes can take different forms and are relatively common in the United
States, especially the fuel tax and excise tax. Here state-enabling legislation is required for
local jurisdictions to levy local motor taxes. Restrictions are often imposed on the localities
as to the use of the revenues, the rates that may be imposed and the procedure for local
approval of the tax. In general, these taxes can provide a significant source of revenue for
public transport, depending on travel patterns.
Florida, for example, has two types of local motor fuel taxes, a voted gas tax and a local
option fuel tax. The voted gas tax allows a 1 percent per gallon tax to be levied subject to
voter approval in a county-wide referendum. The second tax does not require a voter
referendum, implementation simply requires a majority vote of a county commission. A local
motor vehicle excise tax has been implemented in Washington. This is an annual state excise
tax on the ‘fair’ market value of motor vehicles. Cities and counties are permitted by the
State to direct nearly half of the tax revenues for local public transportation needs. In Santa
Clara (California) a fuel tax has been used to fund the local contribution to the San Jose light
railway (Simpson, 1994).
Other examples outside the United States are scarcely known, although in Canada there are
some schemes implemented as well (e.g. Vancouver and Montreal). Public transport in
Lisbon (Portugal) benefits from a levy on diesel oil. Finally, in Germany national taxation
has existed since 1967 which earmarks about 5 Pfennig/litre tax on sold fuel for investments
in urban roads and public transport2.
3.8 Consumption taxes
In general a consumption tax can be described as a tax imposed on consumption goods such
as general merchandise, specific services and luxury items (sales) or utilities (gas, see next
section). Consumption taxes can provide a dedicated funding source for a transit agency, and
through their implementation, agencies can collect a substantial amount of revenue for
operating and capital costs. Transit agencies often use these taxes to replace decreasing
federal funding, build significant capital projects, or supplement operating revenue. These
kind of taxes seem to be common in the United States where many counties or States have
implemented these kind of schemes after obtaining the required voter approval. We
distinguish two forms of consumption taxes: the local sales tax and gambling taxes.
A sales tax is the most common locally dedicated revenue source for transit systems in the
United States. Sales taxes are applied to goods (e.g. books, clothing) and services (e.g. dry
cleaning, house painting) sold in a specific area. In many locations a small tax of one-half
percent can generate a substantial portion of the funds needed for the agency’s operation.
Sales taxes require a strong local retail base to be an effective funding source (TCRP, 1998).
While taxes of any sort are unpopular, sales taxes tend to be more acceptable than most other
forms of taxation. Sales taxes tend to be regressive and the services they finance do not
                                                
2 We owe this example to an anonymous referee
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generally benefit those who pay the taxes. They do provide a stable source of revenue (except
during extreme recessions) and respond quickly to changes in overall income levels. A
distinction can be made between general and specific sales taxes. Specific sales taxes are
applied only onto one particular good such as tobacco (e.g. in Boston) or beer (e.g.
Birmingham, Alabama). Cities with a general sales tax (applied to all goods and services in
an area) dedicated for transit purpose include Denver, New Orleans, Atlanta, Reno, Fort
Worth, Austin and San Francisco (see also Black, 1995). These sales tax schemes are rarely
implemented outside the U.S. Some examples can be found in India (Dalvi and Patankar,
1999), while a proposed scheme in Madrid failed and was not implemented.
Gambling taxes are another form of raising funds for public transport. A portion of lottery
receipts is then dedicated to public transit. In general, lotteries are seen as a controversial
source of revenue. Critics point to the sins of gambling, the opportunities for corruption, and
the high rate of participation by the poor. These gambling taxes only seem to exist in the
United States; examples are found in Maricopa County (Arizona) and Pennsylvania. As for
other proposed tax schemes, the public has to vote before a tax can be implemented. So,
significant community outreach has to be completed to raise support for the lottery tax,
maybe even more than for a sales tax.
3.9 Cross-utility financing
Cross-utility financing may not strictly be an unconventional mechanism, given its
widespread application in parts of Europe, North America and elsewhere. However, it is
adopted on a localised basis, and earmarked to fund public transport. Two methods of how
cross-utility financing operates in practice are identified. The first is via a levy on utility use,
which operates in a similar way as sales and employer taxes, while the second is where a
loss-making public transport department is cross-subsidised by a profitable utility
department. Revenues partly depend on external factors, such as economic conditions and
social trends.
An example of the first type is identified in Pullman, Washington. Transit in Pullman is paid
for by a 2% levy on telephone, water and sewer (owned by the City), electric, gas and
garbage utilities. The levy is collected by utility companies and transferred to the city of
Pullman, which then transfers revenues to the transit department. The levy pays 40% of
operating costs of the city’s 14-vehicle, fixed route and para-transit service. This tax was also
implemented after voter approval. A disadvantage of the scheme is that utility rates
determine the revenues, so if utility rates are not raised with inflation, transit revenue
stagnates. There is also a ‘risk’ that successful energy conservation programmes reduce
revenue. Other examples are to be found in Springfield, Missouri and New Orleans, where a
levy on electric power sales is used to fund public transportation (Cervero, 1983). In
Vancouver, a hydro-power levy is used to cover cost building and operating the city’s
Skytrain system (Simpson, 1990).
The other type, cross subsidy between two utility departments, seems to be more prevalent in
Europe. In Germany (e.g. Wuppertal), for example, public transport systems are still often
municipal departments, and as such are often subsidised by revenues from other municipal
departments, such as water, gas and electricity, that generated a revenue surplus. This
effectively allows the municipality to offset any profits against the losses of the transport
undertaking, meaning that these profits are not subject to corporation tax. However, in the
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long run the liberalisation of the EU will render such models impossible. In spite of this,
Farrell (1999) found that around 100 of the 174 public transport companies in Germany that
are member of the transport operators association VOV still supply utilities, and as late as the
early 1990s around 18% of transport operating costs were covered by profits from these other
activities. Similar arrangements are in place in some Italian (e.g. Milan) and Austrian cities,
as well as in Luxembourg.
3.10 Other unconventional charges
Two other examples of an earmarked scheme to fund public transportation have been found:
a student surcharge and a passenger facility charge. The student surcharge was implemented
after voter approval in Berkeley, California. The local operator AC Transit sought an
improved universal pass program for students of the University of California that would cost
less money and provide more funding for the program. In collaboration with the University
the District decided to give a subsidy for the class pass through a surcharge on student
registration fees.
In the United States, under a law passed several years ago, airports are allowed to charge
passenger facility charges (PFC). The fee is collected by the airlines in the same way as other
air-related taxes at the time the ticket is sold. Projects to be funded must be approved in
advance of collection of the fee by the Federal Aviation Administration. There are several
hundred airports that collect PFC for various projects. While most of these schemes fund
airport improvements, a small number also fund the improvement of access to the airports,
the most notable of which is the new Airtrain light rail linking JFK airport to New York City.
4. Assessment
The previous section identified a wide variety of schemes where public transport has been
financed by an earmarked charge or tax. These case studies were categorised under nine
headings. Although each case has its own characteristics and implications, we attempt to
make a general assessment of the nine categories identified based on various criteria.  The
intention is not to give a value judgement. Instead, the aim is more to draw out common
themes, lessons and experiences. Herewith it is recognised that emphasis on specific
assessment criteria will depend on the case studies; some issues will be more important in
some cases than others. The distinguished criteria are:
! the potential and targeting of the revenue raising;
! revenue allocation (to identify winners and losers);
! practicality (in terms of flexibility, enforceability, complexity and transparency);
! transferability
! acceptability (public, political and business);
! link with environmental or transportation policy;
! effectiveness (achieving its initial objectives).
In Table 1 we will only present the main outcomes as it would be too comprehensive to give
an overview of the full assessment (see for a full overview: Oscar Faber, 2000).
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In general, the fund raising potential of the distinguished cases seems to be high. This is of
course predictable, because otherwise a case would be more likely to have been abolished,
and otherwise might have been more difficult to find. Still, revenues raised in an
unconventional way often form a substantial part of the operating budget or contribute in a
significant way to the construction of new infrastructure in the cases studied and relatively
large sums are often raised. In order to give an indication of this potential for some selected
cases3, the share of unconventional funds in the total operating budget of public transport
companies (or as a percentage of total investment) is presented in Table 1. The rest of the
funds usually come from fares and other (conventional) subsidies.
A few cases were corrected for economic distortions (e.g. externalities). Most of the funding
sources were developed simply in order to generate income to support public transport.
However, examples which do not only raise funds but also affect environmental and
transportation objectives seem to gain increasing interest in many countries nowadays.
Table 1. Share of alternative funds in public transport budget or costs
Category Case Share in operating budget (annually) or Investment
Versement (France) Funded on average 33% of the budget of transport companies
(e.g. 20% of RATP budget in Paris)
Employer tax
Portland (U.S.) Funded 60% of the operating budget of the local transport authority
in 1985
Vancouver (Canada) Funded 61% of the operating budget in 1999Property tax
San Francisco (U.S.) Funded 50% of new infrastructure and 5% of the annual operating
expenses
Development
levies
San Francisco (U.S.) Funded in 1996 about 2% of the operating budget of the municipal
railway (Muni)
Heathrow (England) Funded 0,3% of the total expenditures of the airport
(including large infrastructure projects)
Parking charges
Amsterdam
(Netherlands)
In total parking revenues will fund about 1% of the total
infrastructure costs of the IJtram
Charges for the
use of roadspace
San Francisco (U.S.) Funded 49% of the operating budget of the bus and ferry
organisation in 1997
Local motoring
taxes
State of Washington
(U.S.)
Funded 25% of the operating budget of the local transportation
authority in 1986
Reno (U.S.) Funded 66% of the operating budget of the public transport
company in 1997
Fort Worth (U.S.) Funded 71% of the operating budget of the public transport
company in 1996
Consumption taxes
Atlanta (U.S.) Revenues were divided: 50% earmarked to operating budget (53%
of the budget of the transport company) and other 50% funded new
infrastructure
Cross utility Pullman (U.S.) Funded 40% of the operating costs of the local transport company
                                                
3 Note: These are nearly all cases for which quantitative data were available. Three more consumption taxes
examples could have been added, but produced figures similar to those shown in Table 1.
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The allocation of revenues (where is the money spent on by public transport companies) is
unclear for many cases, and it is very hard to judge the change in efficiency of public
transport after implementing these new ways of funding. But these charging mechanisms are
mostly necessary to keep public transport services at a certain level. Especially in the United
States, examples are known where transit would probably disappear without new funding
techniques. It is also important to recognise that ‘losers’ (identified as payers of the charge)
may also be recognised as ‘winners’, as improved public transport can also be beneficial for
non-users.
Practicality seems not that problematic in implementing these unconventional mechanisms.
Most of the examples rely on existing structures, which keeps costs and complexity relatively
low.  This finding is somewhat predictable as well, as impractical cases would not survive.
Flexibility may be restricted, though, due to the processes required in obtaining (political)
approval.
An interesting point is, whether these alternative mechanisms are transferable to be
implemented elsewhere. It appears to be not that simple to copy successful examples, even
though local circumstances and institutional aspects may often be suitable. One should not
forget that certain categories (e.g. local motoring taxes and consumption taxes) are very
much a product of conditions and taxation systems prevailing in North America. Existing
institutional structures (organising referenda) and tax levels make it possible to implement
more easily new taxes to fund public transport. Implementing these mechanisms in Europe
for example could be more difficult, due to the lack of such processes and existing structures
(e.g. already relatively high taxes on fuel).
Acceptability by the public is often low when a new charge or tax is imposed on them, but
improves when the objective (to fund public transport) is explained. Therefore, transparency
is a key issue. It helps when the public understands the need for revenue, and when the
existing tax structure is regarded as not too onerous. This becomes clear from the American
experiences where people can vote on the proposed implementation of the financing
mechanism (not to be confused with voting on implementation of the facility, which is quite
common in Switzerland, for example). These funding examples can count on political
support concerning the mechanism, mainly due to the fact that it saves subsidies from
general taxes. However, there are also schemes that are not implemented because of the
failure in convincing the public of the need for new or better public transport.
Most of the schemes are implemented just as a funding source because of a shortage of
public money available. All have of course an indirect link to environmental issues as public
transport is generally regarded as being more environmental friendly compared to travel by
car. However, there are important cases that can be linked to environmental policy and
transport policy more obviously. A clear example being the road user charging schemes that
seeks to reduce congestion by pricing the use of the car. In the end, the schemes can
generally be regarded as effective (described as achieving its objectives). Almost all schemes
create a significant source of funding, which is very often a fundamental reason for adopting
them in the first place.
If we then look at the various categories the following impression arises. Table 2 presents the
main outcomes, derived from the assessment of the various identified. It may be clear that
most of the innovative funding techniques have the potential to form a significant and
relatively stable source of revenue. It should be repeated that the aim is not to identify the
best category because each case has its own characteristics and its success depends heavily
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on local circumstances (e.g. existing tax structure, institutional and legality, public
acceptability). This makes transferability for some schemes rather difficult. For example the
local sales taxes may be very useful and widely implemented throughout North America but
this does not immediately mean that the system could easily be transferred to Europe and
form a reliable source of funding for public transport.
Table 2. Main outcomes of the assessment of unconventional funding categories
Categories Main outcomes
Employer/employee tax ! A simple, low cost and practical mechanism that can be very effective in
providing a reliable and substantial fund
! Possibility of companies/public to locate outside public transport accessible areas
! Acceptability initially problematic, but where the transport system is seen as
problematic, businesses may be keen to help address the problem
Property taxes ! A simple, low cost and practical mechanism that can be very effective in
providing a reliable and substantial fund
! Beneficiary pays
! Subject to voter approval in North America
Development levies ! A transferable scheme with varying practicality over the various identified cases
! Usually small scale implementation but high acceptability
Parking charges and fines ! A simple, low cost and practical (transparent) mechanism providing a substantial
fund
! Acceptable and transferable system
! Linked to both transport and environmental policy
Charges for the use of
roadspace
! A flexible and transparent system with a large potential to support public
transport
! Acceptability is problematic
! Linked to both transport and environmental policy
Local motoring taxes ! A large source of revenue, depending on travel patterns
! Transferability depends on existing tax structure
! Acceptable as fuel taxes are common practice; voter approval required in North
America
! Linked to both transport and environmental policy
Consumption taxes ! Transferability might be difficult as these schemes are depending on North
American circumstances
! Tend to be acceptable as voting is necessary, but significant community outreach
has to be completed
! Significant source of revenue although influenced by external factors
Cross-utility financing ! A dedicated source of funding with low costs
! Not really practical to transfer to EU countries due to new legislation
Student surcharge and
Airport fee
! A simple system to collect and easy to understand
! Efficient as it provides a specific service which might not have run otherwise
! Might be problematic to transfer due to local specific circumstances
Of course the potential to be implemented world-wide differs among the schemes. The
increased awareness of the negative external effects of car transport and the general idea of
promoting public transport as good substitute, however, seems to be in favour of schemes
that charge the car. Charging the use of roads is increasingly viewed as an interesting way of
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raising money for public transport and at the same time pricing the externalities of the car.
This holds also to a lesser extent for the parking charges and local fuel taxes. So the potential
for these cases seem to be somewhat higher in especially the highly congested (urban) areas.
The previously mentioned link towards transport and environmental policy principles of
unconventional funding mechanisms is interesting to discuss in some more detail. There are
funding techniques that do not involve a positive environmental impact. These have been
developed simply in order to generate income to support public transport. Consequently,
their relationship to the concept of fair and efficient pricing is ad hoc and unintentional.
Examples of this are the employer taxation, local consumption taxes, cross utility subsidies
and planning gain. Some ‘unconventionals’ are an application of the beneficiary pays
principle (simply said: the one who benefits from a service has to pay for this). This is the
case of the French Versement local employer tax. The rate is higher in city centres where the
benefit of public transport is highest and lower in the suburbs to reflect a lower standard of
public transport. No Versement is charged outside the city. The same principle holds also for
the property taxes. It is important to note that this beneficiary pays principle may stand in
direct contradiction to the more recent principle of ‘polluter pays’ that is behind the EU
concept of fair and efficient pricing. This concept states that a price has to be paid for
transport use including all costs caused. Costs are seldom imputed at the point of use and the
prices paid for a journey rarely reflect the true costs of that journey (EC, 1995). Some costs –
related to environmental problems, accidents and congestion – are only covered partly or not
all. Several opportunities exist to bring these costs into the price paid for the use of transport.
Congestion charging is one of the possibilities to incorporate the costs of congestion. Also
parking charges and the motoring taxes offer possibilities to enhance this fair and efficient
pricing principle and include the external costs of transport use into the price.
5. Concluding remarks
Although the public transport industry is increasingly being encouraged to improve its cost
effectiveness, both by reducing production costs and by increasing revenues, in most
countries it is not expected to become wholly self-financing, even when the industry is
largely in private hands. External financial support continues to be received from a variety of
sources mainly provided by central and local governments. General taxation can be seen as
the main source of revenue used throughout the world. This picture is changing however.
Authorities are to a growing extent looking for alternative sources of funding local public
transportation. Private finance to reduce public sector borrowing and to transfer risk
elsewhere is one of them. Another source, elaborated in this paper, involves earmarked
charging. Earmarked charges are distinct from general revenues, which can be spent on any
legitimate purpose as decided in the annual budget. It appeared that various cases exist where
charges or taxes are hypothecated to fund public transport. Most of the nine identified
categories provide a relatively stable, dedicated funding source with a high level of
practicality. For many of the schemes identified, this unconventional funding forms a
substantial share of the operating budget. From the overview it also becomes clear that
earmarked taxes are widely implemented in the United States, far the most examples are to
be found there. In Europe, relatively few examples have been found. This is mainly due to
the institutional organisation in the various countries and the local character of the cases.
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Local authorities, responsible for the provision of public transport, have a stronger incentive
or need to seek for new ways of financing public transport. Central governments have more
possibilities to make use of existing sources (mainly general taxation, as is the case in
Europe) and seem to have less need for new funding techniques.
In general, unconventional mechanisms have evolved because ‘traditional ways’ of funding
public transport have been withdrawn or are viewed as politically problematic. Governments
have become sensitive to the levels of general taxation, and funding for public transport is
particularly vulnerable to this attitude. This is because consistent expenditure is needed over
a period of time and, importantly, the results of such spending are not usually apparent
within the lifetime of a single government.
There are lessons which can be derived from the previous that should be appreciated for the
design of future unconventional mechanisms:
! Using unconventional mechanisms to fund a popular and specific project is likely to
increase acceptance, transparency is a key issue;
! The schemes need to be as simple as possible. Complexity tends to increase costs and
reduce transparency;
! It may be necessary to reduce other taxes to compensate the biggest losers from the
introduction. A reduction in fuel duty compensated by more targeted unconventional
mechanisms or a cut in other employee taxes might be examples;
! There is a value in phased introduction of unconventional charges, with the flexibility to
fine tune and adopt the mechanisms over time. It is presently impossible to model the
impacts and success of demand management transport policy measures. Flexibility in
mechanisms thus plays a key-role.
We can conclude that a wide variety of schemes is available to fund public transport via
hypothecated charging. Most of them can be very effective in providing a stable and
substantial source of revenue. These schemes are not only interesting as means of raising
financial support for public transport systems but also as a method of sending appropriate
pricing signals to transport use (with the possibility to be integrated with more traditional
general fiscal and regulatory instruments). At the level of the individual unconventional
charging and taxation mechanism, it is possible to identify some that relate well to the
principles of ‘fair and efficient pricing’ in that they involve at least some element of charging
transport polluters. However, the majority of existing unconventional measures have evolved
without reference to guiding principles of public finance. Most have been developed simply
in order to generate funds to support public transport.
Major drawbacks preventing a widespread implementation are in the field of acceptability
and transferability. Public (and thus also political) acceptability is difficult to obtain for a
proposal to implement a charge or tax. The United States examples show that the tax should
be sold to the community. To successfully pass a dedicated local tax for transit, the
community outreach must directly tie the benefits of the transit system to the lives of the
individuals in the community. The public must be made aware of the necessity of the tax and
see the possible benefits of the scheme. On a local scale referenda may be used to let the
population decide whether implementation is justified based on voter approval. When these
hurdles have been overcome, unconventional mechanisms could become conventional and
may form an interesting option for funding public transport world-wide.
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